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Tne re is perhaps no other character in history, certainly 
none in modern times, wno nas been tne occasion of so much and 
sucn diverse criticism as Napoleon Bonaparte. Bntnusiastic ad­
mirers, locking only to tne neight w m c h  ne attained, nave pro­
nounced nim tne greatest genius of tne world, ana trunking only 
of tne good wnicn ne accomplisned, nave declared nim a phiianthro- 
pist, and a martyr to tne cause of numan rights. Goners, viewing 
his deeds with a prejudiced eye. Nave seen in nim nothing but a 
soldier of fortune, a lucky adventurer,' and contemplating only tne 
evil tnat ne wrought, nave denounced nim as an incarnate fiend 
witn no principle but his own overweening ambition.
It requires no philosopher's eye to see tnat both these views
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are wrong. Napoleon was neither an angel nor a demon. Not un­
like our modern trade-wrecker$s,. he was simply a man wno aimed at 
self-aggrandizement, caring little as to the means employed or 
the people injured thereby. »
Tne secret of nis success lay in nis transcendent genius and 
tne peculiar fitness of m s  character ana disposition for nis 
time. He was not tne result of chance - no great man ever was. 
he made use of circumstances as they presented themselves, and in 
the ability to do this lies greatness. He nad an eye tnat saw at
.
once into tne very nature of things, and a determination tnat 
never hesitated to do tne thing in order. He nad a capacity for
ib
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2work that no otner man ever equaled, and an understanding of 
human nature that is rarely excelled. With these characteristics, 
as Emerson says "Napoleon would have been the first man of the 
world if his ends had been purely public." But his motives were 
selfish, and to m i s  fact he owed his fall.
All the influences of Napoleon's youth and his early mani­
festations of character were of a Kind calculated to produce the 
character required of one wnc would become master of the* French 
Revolution. He was born at Ajaccio in Corsica, Aug. lb, 1769, 
only a snort time after that island had been seized by the French. 
The natives, far from submitting at once, retired into tneir mount­
ain fastnesses and for a 10%  time Kept up a most harassing war­
fare under tne leadership of patriotic chiefs. Among these was 
Napoleon's father, a member of the ancient Italian nobility. His 
mother was also of noble descent, and from her lips the young hero 
received his first lessens of devotion to country, ana tne stories 
of war, cruelty, and injustice which set his ardent yourg imagina­
tion all aglow. His father having died early, leaving a large 
family in poverty. Napoleon was transferred in his tenth year from 
this atmosphere of the middle ages to tne military school of 
Brienne. Here the gloomy spirit which his ccuntrie's misfortunes 
produced in him, (for it is a strange fact that even at this ten­
der age m s  mind was not that of a child, but harbored the mature 
thoughts and feelings of manhood), was further aggravated by the
3taunts of m s  noble companions about nis name and country. Tnese 
taunts ne bore with sullen fortitude, prefering to suffer rather 
m a n  ask for protection from tne scnool autnonties. Have we not 
nere f oresxxadcwings of a self-reliant character?
Partly from natural inclination, and partly pernaps from 
social inferiority, tne young Napoleon never mingled in ■society 
witn nis fellows, but was tnorougnly gloomy, unsocial, and melan- 
cnoly, fond of walking and meditating in solitude. Tnere was an 
air of sarcasm about nim tnat rendered Him forbidding to His fel­
lows. Can we wonder tnat in after life ne impressed men as a 
unique, unapproachable being?
In m e  class-room tne young recluse snowed at once remarkable 
ability and a practical turn of mind. He excelled in tne study 
of History, geography, and tne mathematics, but despised* Latin, 
polite literature, and mere decorative studies. His favorite 
reading was Plutarch and Julius Caesar, his favorite characters, 
the greatest military chieftains of m e  world - Alexander, Hanni­
bal, and Caesar of the ancients, Turenne and Frederick tne Great 
of tne moderns. Thus from nis earliest studies and ideals he im­
bibed a love for authority, absolute power and military glory 
which witn opportunity ripened into despotism.
The love of order, as in all great minds, was innate in him. 
Bourienne relates tnat tnat memorable scene of royalty insulted by
4a surest rabble, enacted the 20th of June, 1792, drew from m m  
exclamations of trie greatest surprise and norror.
Sucn were tne manifestations of m s  youthful cnaracter. Let 
us add here a fact vnicn does not appear conspicuously until a 
later time but wnich evidently already existed, and nad a powerful 
influence in Shaping nis destiny. 1 refer to tne deficiency of • 
his moral nature. Great as was the intellect of napoleon, ne 
seems to have been almost wnoily devoid of morality and conscience. 
It is even doubted wnetner ne believed in God. But in my mind 
this point is settled by his answer to tne officers on board trie 
Orient that moonlight night while on nis way to %ypt. To tneir 
atheistic arguments he answered pointing to tne stars; "Very good
gentlemen, but who made all that?" Tnis proves conclusively that/
ne had at least a vague belief in tne deity; but tnat he nad more 
than this 1 uo not believe. His convictions do not seem to nave 
been active enough to influence his deeds. Much of this moral 
laxity was doubtless due to tne influence of environment, for tne 
France of this time was pervaded by an atmosphere that would nave 
"chilled the heart of an angel, and turned to cynicism tne open­
ness of a celestial brow." Infidelity was rife in the country, 
and the social organism was 'shaken to its very depths.
In his earliest recorded acts, and writings we notice a ten­
dency in Hapoleon to Macchiavellism. In m s  "Supper of Beau-
5claire" a parapnlet pubiisued by him before lie had become Known 
bo fame, lie gives evidence tnat m s  philosophy is tne pnilosophy 
of success. On tne overthrow of tne Uirandists, ne transferred 
m s  sympatlnes to tne party of tne mountain, on tne ground tnat 
one ought to support tne stronger party. Later on ne committed 
deeds sucii as deceiving nations, robbing tnem of .tneir works of 
art, ruthlessly divorcing nis wife, and arbitrarily putting men to 
deatn, tne like of wnich would make us turn in Horror from any 
otner man. Tne fact tnat Napoleon does not affect us sc’ is signi­
ficant. We instinctively feel tnat lie lacks the moral sense, and 
we do not judge nim by tne moral standard.
Tnis freedom from moral restraint was ratner propitious tnan 
otherwise to tne rise ci Napoleon enough, as we snail see, it 
eventually caused m s  ruin. It gave nim an advantage over other 
men at first, but ended by alienating une affections of one 
masses, tnrcugh wnorn ne had risen, arid witnout wnom ne could not 
stand.
Let us new review tne career of' tnis marvelous man, whose 
star of glory, rising at. Toulon, sned its portentous glare over 
Lurope for so many years, only to go down in a sea of blood at 
Waterloo.
The first time ne appears to public view is at tne siege of 
Toulon in tne fali of i79b. Tnis strcr^iy fortified place, w m e n
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was occupied by a party or English and disloyal French troops, and 
protected by an English fleet, dad for a lorg time neld out 
against a large force of enthusiastic French troops, owing to m e  
incompetency of their commanders. But finally Napoleon, then a 
young artillery-officer of 24, was placed in command. Tilings im­
mediately took a different aspect. At a glance from his eagle eye 
■he saw that the key to the position was a certain promontory winch 
if taken would cut off the fleet from the city. By working night 
and day he scon had a- number of guns trained upon the spot, when 
such a shower of shot and shell was rained upon the fori as no hu- 
n&n endurance could withstand. Toulon fell, and Napoleon was Known 
to aL 1 tne world.
Once known, his rise was certain, for he was just tne kind of 
man that the time called for. The French Revolution was at this 
period in a most chaotic state. A lorg series of changes of ad- 
mi strati on, ended by tne Reign of Te"ror, had been followed by a 
violent reaction in favor of good government. Tne Convention 
finally brought forth the Constitution of the Year 111, 1795, by 
far the best that the revolution had yet produced. It provided
for a legislative department to consist of a Council of Ancients
*
and a Council of Five Hundred, and an executive department to be 
vested in a Directory of five members. But it failed to meet the 
approbation of the populace of Paris. It laid restraints upon 
their liberties, end restraint was something to winch taey were no
7lor^ger accustomed. Moreover, it wounded tneir pride by providing 
for the return of two tuirds of the members of the Convention, 
and leaving only one third to be elected by the people. Having 
failed to defeat it in the elections, the Sections of P a n s  rose to 
resist it with arms. Barras was made commander-in-chief of the 
forces at the Convention's disposal, but felt himself unable to 
cope with trie fearful odds against him. In this crises he recom­
mended Napoleon as a man wno "would not stand upon ceremony". Tne 
latter accepted the proffered position, and by the way he put 
down the Sections on the following day showed himself worthy of 
the charge.
Trie character of this act is questionable. Some nold tnat he 
did it purely from love of order. Grantir^ that this may have had 
no small influence upon him, there yet remains ground for believ- 
ir^ g that he had interested motives, inasmuch as he had out Shortly 
before been an adherent of the ycurger Robespierre. But the 
statement sometimes mades, that this was his first deliberate step 
towards the grasping of supreme power is absurd. He no more fore­
saw the Empire at this period than Cromwell foresaw his dictator­
ship when first he took the field against Charles 1. The simple 
fact is that he was out of employment, a state that to his restless 
spirit was torture and beir^ ; unrestrained by principle or senti­
ment, he concluded to undertake the task.
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His doing so proved tne salvation of the constitution and 
tne Convention, and perhaps saved trie country from civil war. But 
it was a dangerous precedent, tne foundation for future evil. 
Remembering that tne great fault of tne Constitution of tne Year 
ill was that it left trie executive too independent of tne legisla­
tive body, -without providing means for reconcilement, and m a t  by 
tne manner of choosing, rival parties were at once elected to tne 
two bodies, we see here a cuance for me constant repetition of 
resort to force, and m e  cieanrg of the way for military dictator­
ship.
As to Napoleon, tne Day of tne Sections as it is called, gave
to him the command of tne Army of Italy, and an influence over m e
*
Directory, both of which were to contribute to his further aggran­
dizement. On March 27, 1796, he entered upon his Italian campaign, 
a campaign that stands without a rival in the whole history of 
warfare, save pernaps nis later campaign at Austeriitz. He found 
an army ragged, without food, and wimcut arms, yet in little more 
than a year ne had overthrown four armies, beaten four times nis 
own number of men, and signed m e  treaty of Campo Formio, which 
left France m e  proudest nation in Europe.
What a theme for contemplation is m i s  campaign! What exam­
ples of bravery, energy, heroism does it furnish, and wnat a
mastery of tne art of war! In imagination we are with m e  hero 
at Millessimo, Montenotte, and Dego; we see him sweep tne bridge
9of Lodi at tne dead of nis grenadiers; we are with nim at Castig- 
lione, at Bassano; we see him hurled back back by a tempest of 
balls, end flung into tne marshes of Arcole, yet turning tne tide 
of victory by the force of his genius. We follow him through 
Rivoli, Mantua, onward to tne peace of ILeoben, to tne final peace 
of Carapo Formic. And all this time we remember that he was but a 
youth of 26'. Surely Emerson was right when he called him a man 
of stone and iron, for he had an endurance never approached be­
fore; and again when he called him thought personified in action, 
for who else ever formed such gigantic conceptions and put them 
so quickly into execution? He had shown tne faculty of forming 
at once tne conclusion of his design without overlooking a single 
detail. He had shown himself possessed of an imagination capable 
of forming the grandest conceptions and an ardor equal to that of 
nis most enthusiastic soldier, balanced by a judgment as cool and 
precise as tnat of a mathematician. Wnat wonder tnat tne nation 
adored him, tnat nis army almost idolized nim? Was he not, like 
themselves, the child of tne Revolution? Did not his victoriesi
mean triumph to its principles , to tne great principle "La car- 
riere ouverte aux talents?"
All this is indeed true, but unfortunately there is a darker 
side to the picture. In his manner of conducting tne war he nad 
sncwn himself thoroughly unscrupulous. Upon nearly every city
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that he took, he had laid heavy contributions, not only of money, 
but also of works of art, a tiling unheard of before in the history 
of modern warfare. He had put down an uprising of Italians with a 
merciless severity that showed how relentless he was toward any 
impediment to his will. And what duplicity he had displayed in 
his diplomatic relations with the weaker powers^ Take Venice for 
example. Upon a flimsy pretext he violated her nutrality, con­
quered her, and in spite of his promise to grant her liberty, 
turned her over to Austria in compensation for other territory.
His dealings with the home government show at once his im­
perious temper and his rising ambition. He had declared war and 
nv.de peace like an independent sovereign. The Directory, who on 
account of their unfriendly relations with the legislative body 
needed his good-will and tae money he was constantly sending them, 
dared not oppose him, or when they aid were scon brought to to 
submission by his offer to resign. But when the Council of Five 
hundred dared raise a dissenting voice, he threatened to march his 
army against them. In fact, when matters afterwards came to an 
open rupture between the two departments of government, he sent 
Augerau to help the Directory carry out a coup d'etat against the 
legislative body. This was not because he was a real friend of 
tne Directory, lor on trie contrary, he despised them. Nor was it
on account of his enthusiasm fo republicanism winch the Directory 
at this time represented. In truth, though ne was a Republican,
il
lie would not nave hesitated to join the royalist party, if that 
had offered aim superior advantages. But tne advantage lay with 
the former party, and as the inefficient Directory were but hold­
ing their place till a stronger power might assert itself, he 
espoused tne cause of these. Tne army, w m c h  was wnolly devoted 
to him, he took care to have imbued with the same principles that 
he professed.
I may say in passirg that his manner of gaining tne affections 
of the army snows skill and Knowledge of human nature. His mili­
tary prowess brought much of this, but most was obtained by aliow- 
i*B liberty to plunder, wnile he retained nothing for mmself, by 
personal attentions, by impartiality in rewarding merit, and by 
his stirring proclamations. In tnese he always appealed to the 
sentiments uppermost in the French heart, - noncr and glory, and 
sometimes, as at tne beginning of the Italian campaign, to cupidity.
As might be expected, Napoleon tried to get a seat in tne 
Directory on hi8 return to Paris after the treaty of Campc Formic, 
Knowing that if he once got a snare in power, ne would soon monopo­
lize the whole. But public opinion was not yet ready for such an 
act. xHence ne proposed to the Directory an expedition to Egypt, 
of which ne should be leader. In dcin , this he had several ob­
jects in view. In the first place he could not endure to remain 
idle; then, from his earliest youth ne nad entertained ideas of
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forming an Empire in tne East; .and last, but not least, he had a 
presentiment that■ tne Directory would suffer reverses and fall 
into disrepute duri% his absence, in wnien case ne coula return, 
covered -with new laurels, and easily seise trie dictatorsnip. Tne 
Directory, only tec glad to rid tnemseives of so dangerous a friencj 
accepted his proposition, and in May, i798, ne set sail. After 
remaining in the East about six months, in wnien time ne nad con­
quered Egypt, met witn defeat in Syria, lost nis fleet, and 
furnished additional attestations of nis relentless, not to say 
cruel character, ne learned of m e  disastrous turn affairs nad 
taken in France, his resolution was taken at once. Abandoning 
tne army of Egypt witn tne neroic Kieber, he embarked with a few 
officers and men and landed at Frejus on tne coast of France, Oct. 
1799. This act amounted to little less tnan desertion, but was 
perfectly consistent witn tne Napoleonic character.
Let us now see what had taken place in the meantime in France. 
A coalition had been formed by the great powers of Europe against 
her, Italy had been retaken, ana tne French troops, attacked at 
every point, could scarcely keep tne enemy from the soil of their 
country. The Directory nad fallen into general disrepute, and by 
the election of tne 30th Prairial nad been practically overthrown. 
Tne people, remembering tne days of Napoleon's glorious Italian
campaign, were vehemently declaiming against what they considered 
nis iorced exile. Finally just wnen victory was beginning to re-
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turn tc tne national arms, a bulletin was received from tne army 
in Egypt. It was one of tnose tuat gave rise to tne proverb "false 
as a bulletin", depicting in glowirg terms tne events of one cam­
paign, and making every defeat into a brilliant victory. Tne 
popular enthusiasm rose to its neignt, wnen tc crown ail, it was 
announced that tne hero nad actually returned-.
Thinkir^ that his popularity would warrant tne attempt, he 
at once set out tc seize the reins of government. Several plans 
were tried and failed; but finally a successful scheme was nit upon 
He was reconciled to his old enemy Sieyes, who was already impli­
cated in a conspiracy to overthrow tne Constitution of tne Year 111 
and replace it by another of uis own makirg. Napoleon beirg 
placed at its head, the work was ready to go on. At tne instiga­
tion of some of tne members wno were privy to tne .[ lot, it was 
decreed by tne Council of Ancients that tne legislative body be 
removed to St. Cloud on pretense of protecting it from a royalist 
conspiracy, but in reality for assisting tne operations of tne 
conspirators, and that Napoleon be made commander-in-cnief of tie 
national guard. Tnree cl tne -Directors, two of wnom were conspira­
tors, then resigned, tne other two were arrested, and tne two 
departments of the legislature were successively overawed. T m s  
was on the 18th Brumaire, 1799.
Sieyes constitution was now brought forward and after beirg 
changed to suit Napoleon’s absolute will, was submitted to the
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people and accepted. Napoleon reaped tne benefit of tne coup 
d'etat. He was made First Consul for ten years with w o  assist­
ants. The otner conspirators were pushed aside.
At tne close of tne first consular meeting, Sieyes said to 
ais fellow conspirators: "lientiemen, you nave a master, Bonaparte 
means to do everytning, Knows now to do everytning, and nas tne 
power to do everything." And so it proved to be.
Yet his usurpation was a blessing to France at m e  time. Tne 
country, sunK in debt, devoid of credit, and a prey to anarcny, 
needed a stror^, centralized government administered by an able 
hand. It needed a man wno could put an end to factions by attract­
ing and subordinating ail to himself.
Such a man was Napoleon, and on t m s  account, and for tne 
furtner reason that repeated acts of violence nad produced politi­
cal demoralization, the people quietly acquiesced in nis usurpa­
tion. Moreover, as he nad never identified himself with any party, 
all looked to him to furtner tneir views. But alas I Napoleon was 
no Monk. He strove first, last, and all tne time for m s  own in­
terests .
Now that he was Consul, in compliance with m e  wish of m e  
nation, he offered terms of peace tc Brgiand and Austria. But tne 
former, jealous of m e  growing prosperity of France, and .controlfee 
by the war policy of Pitt, would listen to no proposal, while
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Austria, who was subsidized by English gold, would not enter into 
negotiations without ner ally. Napoleon in his secret heart was 
doubtless glad of this opportunity to win fresh glory, for it would 
strengthen his hold on France. So marshalling ail his nests with
9
nis characteristic energy, ne sent Moreau with a large army into 
Germany, while he himself, crossed the Alps at several places, 
and burst like an avalanche upon Italy. Tne Austrians, deceived 
by the vigor and originality of his tactics, could not combine 
their forces. Milas was overtaken at Marengo, June 18, 1800, 
and in a struggle which nung for sometime in tne balance, was cut 
to pieces by tne terrific onslaughts of Desaix and neilermann. 
inus Italy was again a French possession. A few months afterwards 
Moreau opened a brilliant campaign in Germany of wnich Hohmlinden 
is the crowning star. Austria now signed tne treay of Lunevilie, 
Feb. 1801 which gave France Italy, Belgium and tne German provinces 
on the left bank of tne Rhine. Tne next spring tne treaty of 
Amiens was signed, to which England was also a party.
This treaty heightened the popularity of Napoleon, while it 
left him free to gain further favor by attending to the internal 
improvement cf France. Tne finances were placed on a firm basis, 
public credit was restored, roads and narbors were improved, pub­
lic works constructed and education fostered. In snort ncthirg
escaped tne care and attention of tne First Consul. Recognising 
the necessity cf religion and morality to tne state, and tne
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strer^gth which tne support of the clergy would give him, he signed 
a Concordat with the Pope, reestablishing the Catholic religion 
in France. The reestabisinment of religion was a meritorious act, 
but the Concordat was a hollow mockery, and coming from one known 
to have so little reverance for the Pope as Napoleon, it tended 
rather to throw discredit upon religion than to strengthen it.
To this period belongs the celebrated Code Napoleon. This 
was a codification of the laws of France, which consisted of old 
Roman and customary law, the decrees and ordinances of kings, and 
a vast body of revolutionary law. It swept away many of these 
that had grown obsolete and iniquitous, the neritage of feudal 
sges, and rendered the remainder compact, concise, and harmoni­
ous. Where previously diiferent laws had obtained in every prov­
ince, this coue established uniformity throughout the country. It 
placed the peasant on the same iccting as trie noble, and secured 
the work of the Revolution, Bven today it stands as the framework 
of law in France, Holland, Belgium, Western Germany, Switzerland, 
and Italy, a monument to the genius of Napoleon.
The Legion of Honor was another of the institutions of this 
period that redound to his credit. Its purpose was to reward 
merit and foster genius of every Kind. This not only brought much 
eminent ability to light, but enlisted it all in m s  service. And 
it is surprising to note with what tact he discerned ability. He
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iever mistook his man. Nearly all nis officials, botn civil and 
military, were men of more than ordinary talent - another great 
secret of nis success. Like most of m s  otner works of this 
period, tne Legion of Honor was originated to further his own in­
terests. But where, as in this case nis interests were identical 
with tnose of France, their furtherance was a blessing. But this 
was not always the case. Generally he set about to deprive the 
people of every vestige of liberty. He completed tne organization 
oi tne secret police, estabiisned a rigorous censcrsnip of tne 
press and arrogated to himself tne power of every department of 
government, legislative, executive and judicial. Tne people were 
still allowed to vote occasionally but there'was no lorger any 
eflicacy in this act.. Thus while he kept up a pretense of liberty 
he was building up the most autocratic government in Burope and 
organizirg France into one vast military camp. A child of tne 
Revolution he was betrayirg its every principle and preparing to 
leave France at m s  fall without governmental institutions or 
political habits.
His rise from this period was rapid. First his term of con­
sulship extended through another ten years; then, in lb02, through 
life, with power to name his successor. Finally, in lb04, a con­
spiracy against his life havirg been discovered, the Senate, at 
nis own instigation and for the ostensible purpose of placing him
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beyond the power of his enemies, prevailed upon nim to assume 
the title cf Emperor. Thus the metamorphosis of the government 
was complete. But in trie meantime a similar metamorphosis had 
taken place in the man. Previously to this time his mi.nty ambi­
tion, though unrestrained by moral principles, had been neld in 
check by considerations of prudence. The public favor nad been 
iiis ladder ci ascent, and tnis he had been obliged to conciliate. 
But now he stood alone, unapproachable as a colossus. From his 
dizzy height he looked with scorn upon tne men around him. For­
getting that it was through their belief in his sincerity that he 
had risen, remembering only that he had duped them, he began to 
think that duping was the secret of success. "1 have only to put 
some geld lace on the coat of my virtuous republicans," said he, 
"and they immediately become just wnat 1 wish them." Driven on by 
a boundless ambition, and blinded by self-exaggeration, he new 
began to commit deeds which exasperated Europe against him, and 
vmch aiter an enormous waste of blood and treasure, ended in his 
overthrow, The iirst oi this series of crimes was the murder of 
the duxe d Enghien, committed shortly before his assumption of the 
imperial titie. This and other arbitrary acts, as the seizure of 
Piedmont and tne demand that tne English press be shackled, caused 
England, in 1804, to head a third coalition against him. England, 
Austria, Hussia, and after a time Prussia were trie parties to
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this. Tiie war was virtually decided, on tiie famous field of Aus- 
terlitz, where "with a clap of thunder", ne overthrew the combined 
forces of Austria and Russia. This is regarded as tne most bril­
liantly conceived campaign even of this master of strategy, and 
will go down into tne future with the master pieces of Hannibal and 
Alexander. It forced Prussia and Austria to a humiliating peace, 
■sixteen of tue Gorman states were formed into the Confederation of 
the Rhine, with Napoleon as Protector, a.nd the Holy Roman Empire 
was declared at an end.
Napoleon had triumphed on the Continent, but the battle of 
Trafalgar, fought but a snort time before Austerlitz, forever 
ruined ms.hopes upon the sea. Moreover, it ied him to the fatal 
step cl proclaiming the so called Continental System. Tne object 
Of this system was to ruin England by compelling all European 
countries uo close their ports against ner. Nothing proves more 
clearly than this that self-exaggeration haa blinded tne intellect 
cl Napoleon, lor otherwise he must have seen that such a system 
would be more ruinous to Europe than to England. It proved to be 
so not only directly, but indirectly by involving him in endless 
wars, and exciting universal hatred against him.
liie i emaining history ol Napoleon is one continuous story of 
despotism, usurpation, arid war. He henceforth made and unmade 
kingdoms, dukedoms and principalities at his will. He surrounded
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himself with princes and otner grand dignitaries, tne creatures of 
nis own makirg. hot a brother or relative of nis but could wear a 
crown at the price of servility. His ambition, inflamed by suc­
cess, became a veritable mania, and led him oo trample upon people 
and sovereigns without regard to justice.
Goaded by insult, Prussia next formed an alliance with Russia, 
Sweden, and England against him. Tne battles of Jena and Auer- 
stadt laid her prostrate at his feet, a m  wnat united Europe nad 
failed to do in seven years in tne time of Frederic tne Great was 
acccraplisned nere in less than a month. Tne following year, 1807, 
the struggle with Russia was decided at Eyiau and Priedland, and 
settled by the treaty of Tilsit. Tne result of this treaty was an 
alliance between napoleon and trie Czar, Alexander of Russia, and 
the loss to Prussia oi about half ner territory. Tnis was formed 
respectively into tne Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and the Kingdom of 
Westphalia.
Napoleon treated tne Prussians and tneir King with tne utmost 
insolence and cruelty. But he paid dearly for it afterward. We 
cannot imagine tne venemous natred which such treatment and the 
effects of tne Continental System aroused in them against tneir 
oppressor, and oi tire sullen rage with which they awaited an op­
portunity to crush nim. This opportunity came in 1812.
In 1808 Napoleon was led by nis Continental System to taKe
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anotner fatal step. Portugal nad refused, to m i n  herself by 
carrying out its conditions, upon wnich ne insolently dethroned 
her ruling family and divided ner territory '.vita Spain. The latter 
country was n$xt to suffer from his tyranny. A quarrel naving 
arisen between tae king and trie neir apparent, he took advantage 
of it to dispoil beta parties and give tae crown lo ais brother 
Josepn. But tae Spaniards would not submit tamely to tneir yoke. 
Bverywnere they rose in insurrection, carryirg on a narrassing, 
guerrilla warfare.
Emboldened by tneir success, Austria neaded a fifth coalition 
against the scourge of Europe, who was at tais time apparently 
seeking to revive tae empire of Charlemagne. A series of bloody 
battles, ended by triat of Wagrom again laid ner at nis mercy. Tne 
Peace of Vienna, 1809,left ner almost as destitute as Prussia.
Tne following year, wniie tne war in Spain was still raging, tne 
Emperor enacted tne final scene in nis drama of glory and injustice. 
He divorced Joaepnine, the only woman wnose sincere affections ne 
ever owned, to mane room for a daugnter of tne Caesars, the Arcn- 
• dueness Louisa of Austria. Two considerations led m m  to t m s  act. 
In tne first place ne wanted an neir, for ne wisned to extaolisn’ 
his dynasty; secondly, it would give him a more royal appearance.
It is a strarge fact tnat in all nis power and glory, Napoleon 
never felt quite at nome in nis suddenly acquired dignities. He
22
w a s  Haunted by tne consciousness tnat ne was an upstart, and reared 
tnat unless He made his royalty as conspicuous as possible, people 
would lail to see it. Th us wiien he nad humbled every Hereditary 
monarch of' Europe, ne put on an apish imitation or their court 
manners. By such conduct ne made Himself contemptible even in tne 
eyes of nis own subjects. Wnen He Had succeeded in divorcing him­
self from the Revolution, and placed nimself on a level with other 
monarchs, tney preferred their old Hereditary Kings.
We come now to tne close of tne career of tins mighty but 
deluded man. Tne growing jealousies and misunderstandings between 
him and tne Czar ended in open rupture in 1812. Eapoieon, eager 
to anticipate his rival, invaded Russia late in the stason. After 
several hard-fought battles ne entered Moscow, where ne intended 
to go into winter quarters. But the Russians, employing tne old 
Scytnian tactics, set fire to tne city. Then began that disastrous 
midwinter retreat wnicu tne pen cannot picture nor tne imagination 
fancy. Hordes of Cossack cavalry, following upon the heels of the 
French charged upon them through tne blinding snow, and cut off 
whole companies at a sweep. Tne line of march was strewn with 
starved and frozen bodies, and every encampment was marked by hun­
dreds ol the dead. Ho subiimer picture can be fancied, says Bayne, 
than that of "those brave soldiers, those dauntless, devoted veter^ 
ans, those children of victory, swift as eagles, fearless as lions,
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who had charged on the dykes of Arcole, and nailed the sun of 
Austerlitz, who were tne very embodiment of wild southern valor, 
following Napoleon, the son of tne lightning beneath the dim vault 
of the northern winter, there to iay tneir fire hearts under tuat 
still, pale winding sneet of snow, the northern blast siqgiqg over 
them its scrg of stern and melancholy triumph". Not half of that 
grund army of 700,000 ever returned.
With this defeat, the spell of Napoleon's invincibility was 
broken. All Europe rose against him as one man. Never did his 
genius shine so ongntly as in this last hour of peril, but all in 
vain. The Battle of Leipsic decided his fate, and he was banished 
to the island or Elbe. He might several times have obtained peace- 
on moderate terms before matters came to such a climax, and had he 
had at Heart the interests of France he would have done so, but 
such was his pride and obstinacy, and such his engrossment in self, 
that he preferred to risk losing all rather than give up one iota 
of his acquisitions.
Once more Europe was to feel the might of his genius. Like 
some huge Titan pitched to the earth but not dead, he rose again 
to grapple with his foe. But the struggle was short. Waterloo, a 
name Which suggests great strokes of destiny, and he was banished 
to the rock of St. Helena, there to spend his ciosirg days in sor­
row and lamenting.
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Such is tne story of Napoleon. History offers no sublimer and. 
no sadder tneme. To no man nas fortune ever offered fairer op­
portunities, nor nas any person ever missed them more ingioriously.
Hfc mignt nave become the controller of destiny, but became only\
tne tool. He mignt nave left to France enlarged territory and 
free institutions, to Europe tne fruits of tne Revolution, and se­
cured for nimself the undying gratitude of posterity. Instead, ne 
lelt to tnese great ultimate blessings, but deserves from them no 
tiianks. With an intellect never surpassed, he failed to see the 
tendencies of nis age, or seeing, thought to cnange tnem. He 
failed to see tnat Europe must be conquered by tncught, not by 
anus, and tnat tne dead age of feudalism could ncl be revived.
While he represented the ideas of tne age, ne was mignty, but wnen 
ne opposed tnese, he fell.
Napoleon nad every quality essential to success, except morali­
ty. Lacking this, his ambition led him to resort to unscrupulous 
means for self-aggrandizement, and closed nis eye to tne great 
moral forces tnat were working nis ruin.
Here ends our story. Now let us say with Europe, "Assez de 
Bonaparte.
